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I 
INTRODUCTION 
History is a key context for understanding the authority of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court).1 This half-century old international 
court (IC) has operated in contexts as different as the Cold War and 
decolonization, the emergence of the political and economic process of 
European integration, the post–Cold War period and, most recently, the 
geopolitical power shift that has prompted new transnational projects and 
alliances beyond Europe. The ECtHR’s long period of operation and the 
different socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions under which it has evolved 
are also reflected in the institutional evolution of the Court from a traditional, 
nonpermanent IC that met occasionally in smaller premises to a permanent 
court proudly perched on the River Ill in Strasbourg, France. Moreover, the 
ECtHR has changed from being the product of a Cold War political 
compromise to a high-profile and influential IC with de facto supreme 
jurisdiction over European human rights.2 
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 1.  See generally ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2010); A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE 
GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2004); MIKAEL RASK MADSEN, LA GENÈSE DE 
L’EUROPE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: ENJEUX JURIDIQUES ET STRATÉGIES D’ETAT (FRANCE, 
GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET PAYS SCANDINAVES, 1945–1970) (2010). 
 2.  See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: 
The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 
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The Court’s transformation has contributed to an explosive growth in its 
caseload, most notably since 2000. In its first decade of operation, 1959 to 1969, 
the Court delivered ten judgments; in 2008, the ECtHR delivered its ten-
thousandth judgment.3 Its current docket includes some 70,000 pending 
applications and it delivered 891 judgments in 2014 alone.4 Thus, when 
examined solely at the level of institutional and legal development, the ECtHR 
has undergone a wholesale metamorphosis—a development that its advocates 
and architects could hardly have anticipated. 
This article uses the theoretical framework laid out by Alter, Helfer, and 
Madsen to analyze the transformation of the authority of the ECtHR since its 
genesis.5 Their framework lays out a set of different types of authority in fact: 
from narrow, to intermediate, to extensive authority.6 The extent to which a 
court’s constituencies recognize IC decisions as binding and take consequential 
steps to implement those decisions reflects the type of authority an IC wields.7 
Narrow authority concerns the immediate parties of a given case.8 Intermediate 
authority concerns the larger group of actors similarly situated to the parties of 
a given case, such as potential litigants and government officials charged with 
implementing IC decisions.9 Extensive authority concerns the broadest range of 
actors that engage with the IC—including NGOs, legal professionals, 
academics, and business actors.10 An IC with extensive authority will typically 
be a key institution in developing law and politics within its area of legal 
authority. There is no teleology implied in this theory and different types of 
authority can coexist. Also, the authority of the Court can vary across member 
states. 
From its inception until the mid-to-late 1970s, the ECtHR struggled to 
maintain narrow legal authority. The Court’s judgments influenced the litigants 
involved in these disputes but did not cast a broader normative shadow beyond 
the target state and the specific case.11 The ECtHR’s limited influence was an 
artifact of its very small caseload during its first fifteen years of operation and 
the reality that key member states of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the Convention or ECHR)—notably France and the United 
 
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007) (discussing the process that shifted the Court to its current 
position as the supreme European human rights court).  
 3.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERVIEW 1959–2014, 4 (2015), http://www.echr 
.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592014_ENG.pdf.  
 4.  This number is current as of December 31, 2014. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 6 (2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2014_ENG.pdf.   
 5.  See generally Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes 
the Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 9–12. 
 6.  In their framework, they also include two additional types of authority: no authority and 
popular authority. These two types are not considered in this analysis. Id. at 9, 11–12. 
 7.  Id. at 10. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 10–11. 
 11.  Id. at 16, tbl. 1. 
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Kingdom—were unwilling to accept the Court’s jurisdiction out of fear that it 
would meddle in the decolonization struggles of the period.12 The Court 
responded by deploying a relatively restrictive and often state-friendly 
interpretation of the Convention to facilitate states’ acceptance of the system. 
This diplomatic approach to the Convention had, however, the negative 
consequence that civil society groups, typically litigation-oriented NGOs, found 
the Court to be of little use.13 
Both the Court’s caseload and civil society engagement with the Court 
changed throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s when the ECtHR gained 
intermediate and extensive authority.14 During this period, the Court, with a 
steady and growing docket, became the de facto Supreme Court of human 
rights in Europe.15 Even though there were negative reactions to the Court’s 
expanding jurisprudence and power—first in the United Kingdom, and then in 
France16—member states generally accepted ECtHR judgments, although 
compliance was sometimes partial or delayed.17 Moreover, human rights 
emerged not only as a distinct area of European law but also as a broader legal–
political field marked by contests over the meaning and interpretation of human 
rights as an increasingly important social and legal issue in Europe.18 
The enlargement of Europe in the late 1990s—which expanded the 
Convention’s membership to forty-seven and its geographical reach from 
western Europe to the easternmost boundaries of Russia—had a major impact 
on the Court and its authority. Most notably, in 1998, the ECtHR was 
reconstituted as a permanent IC, and the European Commission on Human 
Rights, previously responsible for filtering applications to the Court, was 
disbanded. At first, these significant changes did not alter the Court’s approach 
to adjudicating human rights cases. The supreme interpreter of the Convention, 
the ECtHR, initially continued to pursue the jurisprudential path developed 
since the late 1980s for the new eastern European member states. Yet the 
combined effects of the institutional transformation and the structural and 
systematic human rights problems in several new member states led the Court’s 
 
 12.  Mikael Rask Madsen, France, the UK and “Boomerang” of the Internationalization of Human 
Rights (1945–2000), in HUMAN RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT  57, 63 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004). 
 13.  See MADSEN, supra note 1, at 178–79. 
 14.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5. 
 15.  See Madsen, supra note 2, at 155 (providing an overall analysis of the construction of the new 
and permanent Court in 1998).  
 16.  For further discussion, see Madsen, supra note 12, at 77, 82.  
 17.  Insiders to the ECtHR system at this time generally claim that there was nearly total 
compliance. See SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 218 n.9 (2014) (“[M]ost of the sources that dealt with this issue claim 
compliance rates are very high.”).  
 18.  For definition of the field, see PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO 
REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 97 (1992). See also Mikael Rask Madsen, Reflexivity and the Construction of 
the International Object: The Case of Human Rights, 259 INT’L POL. SOCIOLOGY 263–64 (2011).  
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caseload to skyrocket.19 The ECtHR could not diffuse its interpretation of 
human rights to lower courts in the same way a constitutional or national 
supreme court might; instead, the ECtHR was forced to serve as the final court 
of appeal for the protection of the individual human rights of more than 800 
million Europeans.20 
With the Court increasingly overburdened and backlogged—yet still 
progressively expanding the scope of the Convention—a number of member 
states launched, for the first time since the Court’s creation in 1959, a systematic 
critique of both the Court’s power over national law and politics and the quality 
of the Court’s judges and their judgments.21 This discontent climaxed with the 
2012 Brighton Declaration, adopted by all forty-seven member states, which 
began an institutionalized process that aimed to limit the ECtHR’s power.22 The 
process before and after the Brighton Declaration raises the fundamental 
question of whether the overall authority of the Court has changed. Although 
more exacerbated in the case of the ECtHR, the situation somewhat resembles 
that of the Court of Justice of the EU—another European IC created in an 
entirely different historical context that, like the ECtHR, also faces a problem 
in terms of eliciting respect for its rulings in a number of Eastern European 
countries. In both cases these implementation problems have in turn spurred 
criticism also in the original member states.23 
This article analyzes the transformations of the Court’s authority by 
emphasizing on one hand the broader historical context of its development—
notably changes at the geopolitical level—and, on the other hand, the 
institutional and constituent-specific contexts influencing the Court’s authority. 
Because of the size of this empirical object, the analysis cannot be exhaustive 
and is instead based on a combination of structural analysis of the broader 
geopolitical context, that is, the overriding global frameworks of power, and the 
ideas that influence and enable actions in both ICs and in regional and national 
settings; more pointed case studies of important member states; and analysis of 
significant changes in the institutional design of the ECtHR. The focal point of 
 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  This spurred a debate among scholars and judges on the precise role of the ECtHR in terms of 
providing constitutional justice or individual justice. For an overview, see Steven Greer & Luzius 
Wildhaber, Revisiting the Debate about ‘Constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human Rights, 12 
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 665 (2012).  
 21.  JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN & MIKAEL R. MADSEN, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present 
and Future of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 230, 239 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2013). 
 22.  BRIGHTON DECLARATION, APR. 20, 2012, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton 
_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf. However, the Brighton Declaration is ambiguous. See CHRISTOFFERSON 
& MADSEN, supra note 21, at 230 (arguing that the Brighton Declaration both limits and extends the 
power of the Court); Laurence R. Helfer, The Burdens and Benefits of Brighton, 1 ESIL REFLECTIONS 
1 (2012) (also arguing that the Brighton Declaration points affects the power of the Court in 
contrasting ways). 
 23.  See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Twenty-First 
Century, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 127–39 (demonstrating that a number of 
European countries are only partly in compliance with the rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU).  
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the analysis is the changing authority of the ECtHR as a result of both broader 
structural changes and country-specific interfaces with the Court. Geopolitics 
set the parameters for the action and reforms of the ECtHR, but the Court’s 
specific authority—and particularly the unevenness of the Court’s authority 
across member states—is for the most part a product of the more local politics. 
Addressing the ECtHR’s ever-evolving authority, part II analyzes the long 
Cold War period from 1950 through 1989 during which the ECtHR transitioned 
into a powerful international court. Part III then turns to the post–Cold War 
period from 1989 to the present, first analyzing the increasing number of 
judgments handed down by the Court, and then examining the possible new 
directions of the Court against the background of its recent criticism. 
II 
THE ECTHR DURING THE COLD WAR (1950–1989) 
Scholars have argued that European governments embraced the Convention 
and the ECtHR, in part, to “lock in” liberal democratic ideals into the Western 
European form of government.24 But although defending Free Europe was a 
key driver in the drafting of the Convention,25 states generally assumed that the 
cost of ratifying the treaty was low.26 Indeed, the original Convention provided a 
flimsy padlock that was easily broken: ratification did not require accepting the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction or the right of individual petitions, through which 
individuals could submit claims to European Commission of Human Rights.27 
Instead, both features, which later became trademarks of the European human 
rights regime, were optional at the time. The judicialization of the Convention 
depended, therefore, on each state’s acceptance of these optional provisions. 
The optional nature of important parts of the agreement—introduced as a 
necessary compromise during negotiation of the European human rights 
system—deeply influenced the authority and practices of the ECtHR until the 
mid-1970s.28 Only after all major member states had accepted these optional 
review provisions did the Court begin to acquire broader authority, analyzed 
below. 
 
 24.  Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 228 (2000) (arguing that the Court was created to “‘lock in’ democratic 
governance against future opponents”). 
 25.  See Marco Duranti, Curbing Labour’s Totalitarian Temptation: European Human Rights Law 
and British Postwar Politics, 3 HUMANITY: AN INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS., HUMANITARIANISM, AND DEV. 
361, 362 (2012) (“[T]hose founding the European human rights regime were exclusively concerned with 
the dangers of communism and fascism.”). 
 26.  See Madsen, supra note 2, at 140. 
 27.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 25, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Convention_ENG 
.pdf [hereinafter Convention].  
 28.  See Mikael Rask Madsen, Legal Diplomacy—Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar 
European Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 62, 
75–79 (Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann ed. 2011) (showing how this forced the institutions to develop a very 
cautious approach to the Convention). 
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As originally designed, European states could choose to only accept the 
jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial institution, the European Commission of Human 
Rights.29 Under the Commission’s jurisdiction, the right of individual petition 
was optional, and ratifying the Convention only resulted in the Commission’s 
compulsory jurisdiction over interstate complaints.30 Further weakening the 
legal dimension of the system, the recommendations of the Commission were 
not legally binding unless the Committee of Ministers accepted them.31 Thus, 
recommendations were principally controlled by an interstate political body 
rather than an independent legal body.32 The Commission, however, had the 
power to bring a case before the Court if the state in question had accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction and the case could not be settled by conciliation.33 
Individuals had no such option, whereas states could choose to refer a case to 
the Court if they had accepted its jurisdiction.34 As a result of this institutional 
design, the Commission rather than the Court initially became the key 
institution in the European human rights system. By filtering applications and 
deciding which cases to review on the merits or refer to the ECtHR, the 
Commission became the central Strasbourg institution and therefore a critical 
player in building the system’s authority.35 In what follows, this article first 
analyzes the period of narrow authority (1953–1974) that resulted from both 
institutional design and the structural limitations imposed by the Cold War and 
decolonization. It then addresses the subsequent period (1975–1989) in which 
the Court broadened its authority by laying the foundations of European 
human rights law and establishing itself as the region’s de facto supreme court 
of human rights. 
A. The Fragile Human Rights System in Search of Authority (1950–1974) 
Ratified by ten member states, the Convention became legally binding in 
1953.36 In 1955, a number of smaller countries—Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, 
Iceland, and Belgium, along with the Federal Republic of Germany—accepted 
the provision on individual petition.37 By 1958, the necessary eight optional 
acceptances of the Court’s jurisdiction had been submitted, once again by a 
group of smaller countries: Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Austria, and Iceland, together with the Federal Republic of 
 
 29.  Convention, supra note 27, art. 46. 
 30.  Id. art. 25.  
 31.  Id. art. 31.  
 32.  The Committee of Ministers also oversaw respondent states’ implementation of decisions by 
the Court and Commission. See id. art. 32.  
 33.  Id. art. 48. 
 34.  Id.   
 35.  See notes 56—61 and accompanying text. 
 36.  The original ten member states of the European Convention were: The United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Saar, and Sweden. 
 37.  See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21. 
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Germany.38 It was the support of smaller European countries that ensured the 
initial establishment of the Convention’s oversight system. Conversely, the two 
major European imperial powers, France and Britain, which together with Italy 
had the greatest influence on the drafting of the Convention,39 both initially 
abstained from accepting the right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of 
the Court. Moreover, the fact that states assenting to these optional clauses 
typically did so only for three or five years at a time combined with the 
reluctance of key member states to commit to a European-level review of their 
human rights practices, put the entire system in a fragile situation.40 
Consequently, both the Commission and the nascent Court needed to prove 
themselves to reticent governments in order to secure the institutions’ 
continuous operation. 
For a new, fragile human rights system in search of authority, the first cases 
to reach Strasbourg were hardly ideal. Filed in 1955, the Commission’s first 
case, Greece v. United Kingdom,41 was an interstate dispute between two North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Greece and the United Kingdom, 
at the height of both the Cold War and decolonization. The issue involved the 
rights of Greek insurgents in Cyprus. Britain had extended the reach of the 
Convention to cover some of its colonial possessions, including Cyprus, yet by 
not accepting individual petition or the Court’s jurisdiction, it was assumed by 
the Foreign Office that this extension was a merely symbolic gesture.42 Greece’s 
interstate complaint effectively bypassed this careful British evasion of the 
Convention system. Coming to terms with being sued by a NATO ally, the U.K. 
Foreign Office eventually defended its actions as a necessary response to the 
emergency situation on the island. The Commission resultantly investigated 
both the alleged violations and the emergency situation.43 
The ambiguity in what role European human rights should play, and the 
recognition—or lack thereof—by member states, is strikingly clear from Greece 
v. United Kingdom. In response to the imminent investigation by the 
Commission, the British Foreign Office analyzed every member of the 
Commission delegation. Although this assessment was only for internal use, it 
clearly revealed the British officials’ disdain for the nascent system. Although 
Waldock of the United Kingdom and Professor Sørensen of Denmark both 
received favorable reviews as “the only members of real caliber,” practically 
every other Commission member was regarded with scorn.44 For example, the 
 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  See generally SIMPSON, supra note 1.  
 40.  A. H. Robertson, The European Court of Human Rights, 9 AM. J. COMP. LAW 1, 18 n.49 
(1960).  
 41.  See generally Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, 2 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174 
(1959) (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.). 
 42.  See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 838–41 (discussing the relathionship between extending the 
Convention yet limiting access to use the Convention).  
 43.  Convention, supra note 27, art.15.  
 44.  See SIMPSON, supra note 1, at 941. 
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Italian Dominedo was described as “garrulous and rather ridiculous individual,” 
and the French Pernot as “quite capable of supporting the British case in the 
morning, the Greek in the afternoon, and a compromise of his own making in 
the evening.”45 
And then there was the question of decolonization and Cold War politics. 
Icelander Jonasson in particular was singled out as not only “NATO’s enemy 
[number one]” but also as “impetuous, obstinate, and ambitious. He is, like all 
Icelanders, an anti-colonialist and very idealistic about anything which does not 
concern him or Iceland. We fear he will vote for Human Rights.”46 In practice, 
the Foreign Office used its intelligence to sabotage the Commission’s visit to 
Cyprus, on numerous occasions allowing only Sørensen and a few others access 
to files and facilities.47 But when British efforts seemingly failed to avoid an 
embarrassing showdown in Strasbourg with this cast of apparently unfriendly 
European jurists, the United Kingdom eventually solved the case by 
diplomacy.48 In 1959, Britain gave up its colony, and no further action was called 
for in Strasbourg—a result viewed with some relief by all parties.49 
Also in 1959, the ECtHR was finally ready to receive cases. Mirroring the 
Commission’s experience, the Court’s became embroiled in high politics in its 
first dispute. The 1959 Lawless50 case concerned the practice of detention 
without trial in Ireland during an IRA insurgency, a matter also of British 
interest.51 The European Commission and the Court both found that the 
practice violated Article 5 of the ECHR.52 Yet the Court also found that the 
Irish Government was acting in conformity with the Convention because, under 
the treaty’s derogation clause, the “life of the nation” was threatened.53 
Although the outcome of the case once again pleased governments, the Court 
nevertheless asserted the power to decide precisely when such situations of 
emergency existed—a small but important step for the Court. 
The Irish and Greek cases are illustrative of the legal–diplomatic nature of 
the Convention system at this point in time. The Court and Commission had to 
strike a fine balance between developing the Convention and simultaneously 
persuading reluctant governments of the institutions’ sensitivities to complex 
domestic sociopolitical contexts.54 Both the Commission and the Court found 
 
 45.  Id.   
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. at 991.  
 48.  Id. at 1049–52.  
 49.  G.A. Res. 59/32 (Dec. 1, 2004).  
 50.  Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 3 (1960) (“[I]n his Application 
that there has been a violation of the Convention in his case, by the authorities of Ireland, inasmuch as 
he was detained without trial.”).  
 51.  See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 2. 
 52.  Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B). 
 53.  Convention, supra note 27, art. 15.  
 54.  See generally The Greek Case, App. No. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, 1969 Eur. 
Conv. on H.R. 1 (1970); see also Madsen, supra note 28, at 78–79.  
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violations in very few cases and gained the image of being minimalistic and even 
state-friendly in their operations.55 Statistically, the Commission played a 
significant gatekeeping role; it decided whether or not to refer an individual 
complaint to the Court.56 Through this structure, the Commission in part 
controlled the development of the Court’s jurisprudence.57 Equally important 
was the Commission’s power to screen applications. Of the 713 individual 
complaints received by the Commission from July of 1955 to March of 1960, 710 
were rejected.58 During the next decade only fifty-four cases were declared 
admissible out of some 3,600 applications.59 And of this small number of 
admitted cases, the Commission found violations of the Convention in only a 
handful.60 Consequently, among potential litigants, the Commission gained a 
reputation for dismissing cases.61 
The situation at the Court was even more striking. During its first decade of 
operation, 1959 through 1969, the Court was involved only in ten cases.62 In fact, 
after the Lawless and De Becker63 cases, the Court was practically without work 
during the mid-1960s, which led some to question whether it should be shut 
down due to inactivity.64 Only toward the end of the decade did the Court 
slowly start gaining renewed public and political prominence. When the 
governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands 
simultaneously filed interstate complaints for very serious violations of the 
Convention against the Greek colonels who had seized power in Greece,65 the 
system’s role as the guardian of freedom was symbolically reinstated.66 The case 
received significant press coverage and ended with the withdrawal of Greece 
from the Council of Europe.67 It also showed, however, that the balance 
 
 55.  Madsen, supra note 28, at 76. 
 56.  Convention, supra note 27, art. 48. 
 57.  Member states that had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court could equally appeal to the 
Court. See id.  
 58.  Gordon L. Weil, Decisions on Inadmissible Applications by the European Commission of 
Human Rights, 54 THE AM. J. OF INT’L LAW 874, 880 (1960).  
 59.  MARK JANIS, RICHARD KAY & ANTHONY BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
TEXTS AND MATERIALS 25 (2000).  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.   
 62. See Madsen, supra note 28, at 74.   
63.  De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, 59 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 214 (1962). 
 64.  See, e.g., Henri Rolin, Has the European Court of Human Rights a Future, 11 HOWARD L.J. 
442 (1965). This led to discussions of new competences of the Court. For example, Protocol No. 2 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 44, Sept. 21, 
1970, conferred upon the ECtHR the power to give advisory opinions.  
 65.  See generally The Greek Case, App. No. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, 1969 Eur. 
Conv. on H.R. 1 (1970). 
 66.  MIKAEL RASK MADSEN, The Protracted Institutionalisation of the Strasbourg Court: From 
Legal Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 43, 53 (Mikael Rask Madsen & Jonas Christoffersen eds., 2011).  
 67.  As Shai Dothan has argued, it is hard to imagine a similar scenario to the earlier case of 
Lawless, when the Court was much weaker, and the opposition and member states were much stronger. 
See DOTHAN, supra note 17. 
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between internationally legalized human rights and Cold War political 
objectives created divisions within the system. Although a number of smaller 
countries with strong democratic records used the Greek case to advocate for 
an idealist approach to human rights, the larger member states—notably the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany—were reluctant because they feared 
that isolating Greece would jeopardize the Greek commitment to NATO.68 
Jurisprudential developments also surfaced behind this cloud of Cold War 
politics. The 1968 Belgian Linguistics69 case was the first case in which the 
ECtHR found a violation of the Convention, although by a highly divided eight-
to-seven vote. It nevertheless signaled that a majority of the judges were ready 
to give Convention rights and freedoms an effet utile.70 
Considering both the number of applications as well as the diversity of 
applicants from states to individuals during this early period, there is little doubt 
that relevant legal constituencies were aware of both the Court and the 
Commission. Yet the European human rights system was not highly esteemed 
in all camps. Because of system’s reluctance to admit cases or to find violations, 
lawyers and activists generally saw little use in going to Strasbourg.71 The 
obvious spokesmen for the Convention—the part-time judges and 
commissioners in Strasbourg—were only haphazard advocates for the system 
when fulfilling their national roles.72 Finally, the judgments of the ECtHR were 
so fragmented and specific that most member states and lawyers did not 
consider them as having an effect beyond the litigating parties—the definition 
of narrow authority in the model of Alter, Helfer, and Madsen’s framework.73 
The system also suffered from a number of external structural limitations. 
First, the broader geopolitical contexts in which it operated—the Cold War and 
decolonization—were not conducive to establishing authority because they put 
key member states, notably the United Kingdom and France, in highly complex 
political situations. Second, the very notion of human rights law was ambiguous 
and was more often associated with politics than law, partly as a consequence of 
the linkage between international human rights and the Cold War,74 and partly 
 
 68.  In fact, the Greek junta benefited more generally from Western support, including U.S. 
support, as, out of a pure Cold War logic, the colonels were seen as a guarantee that the country would 
not move toward a neutral or pro-Soviet position. See, e.g., ALEXANDROS NAFPIOTIS, BRITAIN AND 
THE GREEK COLONELS: ACCOMMODATING THE JUNTA IN THE COLD WAR (2012). 
 69.  See generally Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in 
Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, App. No. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64 
(1968). 
 70.  Id. “Effet Utile” is the method of understanding international treaties.  
 71.  For details, see Madsen, supra note 1.  
 72.  The civil servants of the ECHR institutions and a group of judges and commissioners were the 
main promoters of the system in its initial years of operation. See Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, The 
ECHR and the Birth of (European) Human Rights Law as an Academic Discipline, in LAWYERING 
EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD 117, 120–21 (Bruno de Witte & 
Antoine Vauchez eds., 2013). 
 73.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5. 
 74.  See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Human Rights and the Hegemony of Ideology: European 
Lawyers and the Cold War Battle over International Human Rights, in LAWYERS AND THE 
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because many European legal systems did not have a developed human rights 
jurisprudence. These structural limitations resulted in a Court that attracted 
complaints but had only narrow authority as it failed to cast a legal shadow 
beyond particular case-by-case interventions. 
B. The Emergence of the ECtHR as a Powerful International Court (1975–
1989) 
The Court’s limited role and authority changed over the following fifteen 
years, rapidly metamorphosing the Court from a paper tiger to a court with real 
teeth and both intermediate and extensive authority. In this process, the initial 
minimalistic approach of the Strasbourg system paradoxically constituted an 
advantage. Major European powers’ failure to fully accept the jurisdiction of 
the Court and the right of individual petition had turned the institutionalization 
of the ECtHR into a “game of cat and mouse” in which the Court was being 
dragged around by the member states.75 Although the immediate consequence 
of this limited external recognition of the ECtHR was its fragility as institution 
and limited legal shadow, the Court’s minimalistic approach to the Convention 
also had a positive side effect: more and more governments accepted the Court 
and the individual petition because they simply did not fear the Court’s 
influence.76 The United Kingdom did so for three years starting in 1966 based 
on precisely such an assessment.77 This assessment was not unique to Britain—
in 1973, both Italy and Switzerland followed suit. The next year, in the 
aftermath of President Pompidou’s sudden death and with the fading memory 
of the war in Algeria, France finally ratified the Convention and accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction, although individual petition was accepted only much later, 
in 1981.78 The democratization of Greece, Portugal, and Spain also brought 
these countries into the ECtHR protection system in 1974, 1978, and 1979, 
respectively.79 
Three further exogenous factors influenced this expansion of the Court’s 
authority. First, the originally limited space for developing the Strasbourg 
system was mainly due to geopolitical constraints deriving from Cold War 
politics as argued below. That made lawsuits between NATO allies—and 
corresponding denunciations of NATO countries as violators of human rights—
very damaging to the collective interest of Western Europe. By the early 1970s, 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 258 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth eds., 2012) 
(demonstrating the close link between early human rights practices and Cold War politics); see also 
HOWARD TOLLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS: GLOBAL ADVOCATES OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 34 (1994).  
 75.  Anthony Lester, The European Court of Human Rights after 50 Years, in THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 98, 100 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael 
Rask Madsen eds., 2011).  
 76.  MADSEN, supra note 66, at 51–52.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  The only countries that had accepted neither the individual petition nor the Court were 
Turkey, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus.  
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however, the Cold War seemed to be in retreat; détente politics became the 
name of the game. Second, decolonization was virtually over by the early 1970s, 
at least for the larger colonial possessions, which made the international 
positions of France and the United Kingdom much less at risk.80 A structural 
change in human rights discourse also occurred around this time, with the focus 
of the discourse moving from the practices of European imperial powers to 
other perpetrators such as military dictatorships in Latin America, the 
apartheid regime in South Africa, and Eastern Europe’s Helsinki Process.81 A 
third factor that influenced the ECtHR during this period was European 
integration. Whereas the initial Strasbourg jurisprudence was very case specific, 
after 1975, the idea of a Europe of common standards made its entrance as an 
additional justification for more progressive human rights developments.82 The 
standards in question were, however, not the common-market ideas of the 
European Community but values derived from sociopolitical developments of 
the more permissive and less patriarchal society that was taking form in many 
European countries.83 In other words, changes in geopolitics opened up a new 
space for developing a jurisprudence that sought to couple European human 
rights with intra-European societal developments. 
The ECtHR’s burgeoning power during this period is immediately apparent 
from its legal practices. The jurisprudence of the last half of the 1970s set a new 
tone—a dynamic championing of European human rights—that was very 
different from the self-constrained legal diplomacy of the previous period. In a 
series of landmark decisions, the Court fundamentally transformed European 
human rights from a project mainly linked to Cold War objectives to both an 
independent mission of setting common standards across Europe and a quest 
for a real protection of human rights under the ECHR.84 
In the late 1970s, the framework for this distinctively European protection 
of human rights was hammered out in three key cases: Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom,85 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom,86 and Airey v. Ireland.87 The Irish case 
 
 80.  See generally DIETMAR ROTHERMUND, THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
DECOLONIZATION (2006); MARTIN SHIPWAY, DECOLONIZATION AND ITS IMPACT: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH TO THE END OF THE COLONIAL EMPIRES (2007). 
 81.  See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: 
The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics, 
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORY (2010). 
 82.  See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 83.  The literature is large on this subject but with regard to its impact on the development of 
rights, see particularly STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND POLITICAL CHANGE (2004). 
 84.  The Court began this new wave of jurisprudence in Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
4451/70, 18 Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1975); National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium App. No. 4464/70 
(1975); Handyside v. United Kingdom App. No. 5493/72, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Kjeldsen, 
Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark App. No. 5095/71; 5920/72; 5926/72, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1976).  
 85.  Ireland v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).  
 86.  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A) at 12 (1978). 
MADSEN_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2016  7:22 PM 
No. 1 2016] THE CHALLENGING AUTHORITY OF THE ECTHR 153 
offered ECtHR judges a chance to revisit the tricky question of national 
emergencies, an issue for which the Court had previously shown great 
deference to the member states in the Lawless case.88 The case was a 
controversial interstate complaint against the United Kingdom concerning five 
interrogation techniques used by British security forces in Northern Ireland.89 
The Court held that these practices could not be justified by merely citing to a 
national emergency.90 The Court found that the interrogation techniques in 
question violated the nonderogable Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits 
inhuman and degrading treatment—a provision that must be respected even in 
situations of political unrest and violence.91 
In the same year as Irish, the ECtHR decided Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 
a case concerning corporal punishment of an underage pupil.92 The Court 
famously stated that the Convention was “a living instrument . . . [to] be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions . . . and commonly accepted 
standards in the . . . member states.”93 This set the stage for the Court’s later use 
of a highly controversial, dynamic interpretation of the ECtHR. 
The following year, in Airey v. United Kingdom, the Court further extended 
its reach by noting that “[t]he Convention is intended to guarantee not rights 
that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.”94 
Somewhat similar to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in its 
formative period,95 the ECtHR managed to devise a tripartite framework that 
consisted of nonderogable rights,96 dynamic interpretation,97 and the 
requirement of an effective and practical protection of rights by the member 
states.98 The decisions were not all unanimous or easily swallowed by the 
respondent countries, but they made a strong claim for the Court being the 
authoritative interpreter of the Convention. 
In 1976, a pattern of growth began in the number of cases under the Court’s 
review. Figure 199 shows the total number of judgments delivered each year 
 
 87.  Airey v. Ireland App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1979); see also Marckx v. 
Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (ruling out distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate children and imposing a positive obligation on member states).  
 88.  Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1960). 
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A) (1978). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Airey v. Ireland App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
 95.  See J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (arguing that in 
the foundationa period of European law, from 1958 through mid 1970s, the European Court of Justice 
created constitutional framework of consisting of direct effect, supremacy, implied powers, and human 
rights). 
 96.  Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1960). 
 97.  Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A). 
 98.  Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
 99.  All data reflected in the tables included in this article have been generated by using the 
database at iCourts. 
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human rights law played practically no role in domestic Danish law and 
politics.108 Cases brought against Denmark were summarily dismissed, with only 
limited exceptions, for which no violations were found. Equally important, the 
Danish government concluded that very few legislative revisions were required 
to conform Danish and European human rights standards—with the exception 
of securing a minimum level of protection of the (negative) freedom of 
association within respect to “closed-shop” unions due to the Court’s ruling in 
Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom. Not until 1989, in the Hauschildt 
case109 concerning impartiality of single-judge provincial courts in criminal 
proceedings, was Denmark found to be in breach of the Convention. The 
ECHR was long viewed mainly as a tool for the country’s international 
engagement. Illuminatingly, Denmark once again joined forces in 1982 with the 
other Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, and France in another interstate 
complaint, this time against Turkey.110 And this perception of the ECHR was 
not unique to Denmark. Other states party to the Convention continued to 
regard the Strasbourg system as a positive but distant institution, essentially 
international and therefore of little domestic importance.111 
In stark contrast to Denmark, the United Kingdom became “the most 
regular customer in Strasbourg” throughout the 1980s.112 Although there had 
been some warnings in the two interstate cases involving Cyprus113 and 
Ireland,114 as well as the individual petition cases of Golder,115 Tyrer,116 and 
Airey,117 it was still assumed in the Foreign Office that the United Kingdom’s 
relationship to international human rights was that of exporting legal norms 
rather than importing them.118 Yet as a consequence of the ECtHR’s multiple 
findings of U.K. violations of the Convention—twenty-two from 1975 to 1989—
the continuous acceptance of “the right to individual petition came up as a real 
question” at the highest political level.119 Emblematic of the situation at the 
 
courts in criminal proceedings). 
 107.  See generally Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael Rask Madsen, The End of Virtue? Denmark and 
the Internationalisation of Human Rights, 80 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 257 (2011). 
 108.  Id. (arguing that European human rights was practically dealt with as matter of foreign policy).  
 109.  Hauschildt, 158 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
 110.  Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands v. Turkey, App. No. 9940–9944/82, 
35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (1983). 
 111.  See, e.g., Malcolm Langford & Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The Nordic Human Rights Paradox, 
(Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper, No. 2013-35, 2014). 
 112.  Interview with Senior Legal Advisor in the British Foreign Office, conducted on May 8 2001 
by author.  
 113.  Cyprus v. Turkey I-III, App. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, 2 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125; 
App. No. 8007/77 (1975). 
 114.  Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1960). 
 115.  Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1975). 
 116.  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (ser. A) (1978). 
 117.  Airey v. Ireland App. No. 6289/73, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
 118.  See generally Madsen, supra note 12, at 80–82. 
 119.  Interview with Senior Legal Advisor in the British Foreign Office, conducted on May 8, 2001 
by author. The 1966 U.K. decision to accept the jurisdiction of both the European Court and 
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time—and in sharp contrast to the current conservative British government—
the Thatcher government’s response was that “the U.K. was not to pull out, but 
the Court to pull back.”120 But behind the critical public rhetoric, the United 
Kingdom generally took consequential steps to implement lost cases in 
Strasbourg as well as take proactive steps to more generally comply with 
European human rights norms.121 The one exception was Brogan and Others v. 
United Kingdom,122 in which the ECtHR found that the long detention period 
permitted by the British Prevention of Terrorism Act violated Article 5(3). 
After expressing anger and sympathy for the victims of terrorism in the House 
of Commons, Thatcher announced that Britain would refuse to accept the 
judgment and would derogate from certain provisions of the Convention.123 
In more institutional terms, the British government’s frequent interaction 
with Strasbourg had significant consequences. First, it resulted in human rights 
being “domesticated” and the British Home Office increasingly took over from 
its Foreign Office.124 Another important consequence was that the U.K.–
Strasbourg interaction triggered the development of specialized human rights 
lawyers in the United Kingdom, a unique situation in Europe at the time.125 
Much of this legal activism was directly linked either to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland or to the increasing rift between the British left and the Thatcher 
government regarding the protection of civil and political rights, such as the 
rights to strike, assemble, or protest.126 In other words, whereas geopolitics had 
enabled the ECtHR to pursue a different interpretive strategy since the mid-
1970s, it was domestic feuds that fueled the making of a distinct British human 
rights environment in the 1980s—an environment that would have influence 
beyond the British Isles.127 
The legal establishment, however, was initially averse to using the ECHR. 
As one prolific human rights barrister recalled, “It was distinctively seen as 
 
Commission only ran for a specified renewable period until the incorporation into British law of the 
Convention by the 1998 Human Rights Act. See supra text accompanying note 40; see also Human 
Rights Act of 1998 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents. 
 120.  Interview with Senior Legal Advisor in the British Foreign Office, conducted on May 8, 2001 
by author.  
 121.  Madsen, supra note 12, at 81.   
 122.  Brogan and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84; 11266/84; 11386/85, 11 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 117 (1988). 
 123.  K.D. EWING & CONOR A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
MODERN BRITAIN 224–25 (1990).  
 124.  Madsen, supra note 12, at 81.   
 125.  To use the case of Denmark again, only one Danish lawyer specialized in the field, and his 
practice covered all of Scandinavian human rights. See Mikael Rask Madsen, L’Emergence d’un champ 
des droits de l’homme dans les pays européens: enjeux professionnels et stratégies d’Etat au carrefour du 
droit et de la politique (France, Grande-Bretagne et pays scandinaves, 1945–2000) (2005) (unpublished 
Ph.D Dissertation, l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales) (on file with author). 
 126.  See generally EWING & GEARTY, supra note 123. 
 127.  Some NGOs—for example, the National Council of Civil Liberties and JUSTICE—date back 
much longer, but they only started investing in the ECtHR in the 1980s. See Madsen, supra note 12, at 
82.   
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unfashionable to use the ECHR . . . even treacherous . . . one was seen as being 
in the last ditch or in a hopeless case if you referred to it . . . I was perceived as a 
maverick that had an obsession that was un-British . . . .”128 But with the 
entrepreneurial efforts of a handful of key barristers, the situation was quickly 
reversed and these human rights lawyers went on to repeatedly secure victories 
against their home state in Strasbourg.129 Unsurprisingly, roughly half of the 
cases against the United Kingdom during the period in focus involved 
specialized human rights NGOs.130 
Due to these and other developments, Britain became the frontier in which 
the ECtHR acquired intermediate and extensive authority. That is, the United 
Kingdom was the first member state in which the Court had a real, immediate, 
and continuous domestic importance as well as a broader audience. Although 
the strengthened respect for, and pursuit of, human rights in the United 
Kingdom had no real counterpart in other member states, it had some presence 
in academia on the continent, where law schools had started to integrate 
European human rights into the curriculum.131 Human rights centers, most often 
established on the fringes of legal academia, were an additional innovation of 
the 1980s. In Britain, the pioneers were at Essex University, which hosted key 
professors and litigators of European human rights.132 In other countries, 
notably in Scandinavia, well-funded human rights centers were also set up, but, 
in line with the general view of human rights as an “export good,” they took a 
broader global perspective.133 Internally focused human rights centers required 
more time to take root.134 
The state of human rights and ECtHR authority during this period is best 
labeled, due to the varied state of human rights across member states, as narrow 
and intermediate authority, with flashes of expansive authority.135 There is little 
doubt, however, that the late 1980s ushered in a new era of broader authority 
for the ECtHR. This expanded authority was evident in the Court’s increasingly 
packed docket, general impact on human rights, and ability to spur broader 
interest in the field.136 Although a situation similar to the United Kingdom’s 
increasingly intense interface with the ECtHR did not develop in other 
Convention member states until the 1990s,137 it was throughout this period that 
the ECtHR slowly came to be regarded as the central European human rights 
 
 128.  Interview with leading London barrister specializing in human rights (Feb.  26, 2001).  
 129.  For details, see Madsen, supra note 12, at 81.   
 130.  CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, PRESSURE THROUGH LAW 254–68 (1992).  
 131.  For details, see Madsen, supra note 125.  
 132.  The Essex Human Rights Center would eventually develop into, de facto, the largest human 
rights law office in Europe, later being the spearheading into what later was known as the Kurdish 
cases. Id. at 554–55.  
 133.  Id. at 358–64 
 134.  Id.  
 135.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5. 
 136.  See supra fig. 1. 
 137.  See generally Madsen, supra note 2.  
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institution.138 
III 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN EVER-LARGER EUROPE (1990–2014) 
After the end of the Cold War, the ECtHR started generally to deliver a 
significantly higher number of judgments per year. Further change occurred 
between the periods 1990 through 1999 and 2000 through 2014 as both the rate 
of applications to the Court and the Court’s output expanded substantially after 
2000.139 The Court continued its trend of the 1980s until about 1999 with a 
steady increase in the number of judgments, from around thirty in 1991 to 177 
in 1999.140 Between 2000 and 2014, this trend accelerated. The Court issued 695 
judgments in 2000 and 1,624 in 2009.141 The number dropped to 891 rulings in 
2014.142 The drop in the annual number of judgments beginning in 2011, 
however, is a relative one as it is a product of change in policy at Strasbourg to 
join cases such that more applications are listed in a single judgment.143 In 2013 
and 2014, for example, the Court judged 3,661 and 2,388 applications but 
delivered only 916 and 891 judgments, respectively.144 The year 2013 had the 
highest figure ever in terms of number of applications judged. Figure 3 provides 
the number of judgments delivered each year during the period from 1990 to 
2014. The two periods (1990–1999; 2000–2014) are indicated with different 
shading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138.  Id. at 154–55. 
 139.  See infra fig. 3. The period after 2000 is marked with darker coloring. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  The use of so-called pilot judgments on test cases, general measures, and a 2009 priority policy 
has also influenced output. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 
2011 4–5, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2012_ENG.pdf. 
 144.  See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013 4 (2014) 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2013_ENG.pdf; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2014 5 (2015) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis 
_2014_ENG.pdf.  
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thus created a fundamental challenge not only to the high standards set in the 
1980s and 1990s but also to the Court’s strategy of spinning an expansive and 
tighter normative web of European human rights.147 
Closely related to the challenges the massive member state intake 
precipitated, a major overhaul of the system’s institutional design provides 
additional context to explain the increase in the Court’s activity described in 
Figure 3. With Protocol No. 11’s entry into force in 1998, the ECtHR was 
transformed into a permanent IC with compulsory jurisdiction and compulsory 
right to individual petition.148 As part of the institutional overhaul, the 
Commission was closed down and the supranational protection of human rights 
in Europe was fully judicialized.149 Importantly, Protocol No. 11 was not simply 
the result of the transformation of post–Cold War Europe.150 In fact, the 
negotiation was initiated in 1983 when it became apparent that the Commission 
had difficulties dealing with what was identified as a serious backlog of cases.151 
Most of the design choices of Protocol No. 11 were therefore prompted by the 
operational contexts of the 1980s and early 1990s. This had the consequence 
that the CoE had to draft additional new protocols to adapt the new, single, 
permanent court to the operational contexts of the larger Europe which in the 
meantime had come under the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. To analyze these 
continuous changes in the Court’s authority, in what follows, this article first 
traces the authority of the Court from 1990 to approximately 2000 to show the 
gradual transition from the original pre–Protocol No. 11 Court into the 
permanent Court. It then examines the growing discontent with the permanent 
Court and its rapidly growing backlog of cases and how this criticism 
culminated around the Brighton Declaration of 2012. 
A. Judicializing and Embedding Human Rights in Western Europe (1990–2000) 
As indicated by Figure 3 above, the evolution of cases before the ECtHR in 
the 1990s follows a steady but limited growth pattern that began in the early 
1980s. Although Britain was the main violator of European human rights and 
the frontier of the development of the human rights field in the 1980s, other 
countries led the charge during the 1990s.152 The United Kingdom saw an 
overall decline in relative number of cases in Strasbourg whereas Italy, France, 
 
 147.  There is a large literature on the interpretive approaches of the Court. See, e.g., Laurence R. 
Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural 
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 125 (2008). 
 148.  See Convention, supra note 27, art. 19.  
 149.  See Convention, Protocol 11 pmbl., supra note 27 (restructuring the control machinery 
established thereby, 1 November 1998). 
 150.  SWEENEY, supra note 145.   
 151.  Robert Harmsen, The Reform of the Convention System: Institutional Restructuring and the 
(Geo-)Politics of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND 
POLITICS 119, 119 (Jonas Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2011). 
 152.  See supra fig. 3. 
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and Turkey became the most frequent respondent states.153 Figure 4 lists the 
percentage of total output of judgments for a representative number of Western 
European member states. Figure 4 suggests that France, Italy, and Turkey are 
key countries for understanding the ECtHR’s changing authority during the 
1990s. Italy and Turkey, although quantitatively the most significant countries 
in terms of the number of judgments against them, are actually outliers. The 
case of France is more representative of the general transformation of the 
Court. 
 
Figure 4 
 
                   
                    Year 
Country 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Austria 10.00% 6.94% 6.17% 15.00% 6.00% 17.86% 6.94% 8.57% 1.89% 1.69% 
Belgium 0.00% 6.94% 6.17% 1.67% 4.00% 1.79% 2.78% 2.86% 1.89% 1.13% 
Denmark 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.00% 0.00% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
France 13.33% 8.33% 14.81% 21.67% 14.00% 23.21% 19.44% 14.29% 25.47% 12.99% 
Germany 0.00% 1.39% 4.94% 1.67% 4.00% 1.79% 2.78% 2.86% 0.00% 1.69% 
Italy 0.00% 52.78% 54.32% 23.33% 10.00% 8.93% 11.11% 19.05% 6.60% 40.11% 
Netherlands 16.67% 2.78% 1.23% 5.00% 10.00% 8.93% 6.94% 3.81% 4.72% 1.13% 
Switzerland 13.33% 2.78% 1.23% 6.67% 6.00% 1.79% 4.17% 5.71% 4.72% 0.00% 
Turkey 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.36% 6.94% 7.62% 16.98% 10.73% 
United Kingdom 20.00% 5.56% 3.70% 10.00% 14.00% 14.29% 16.67% 9.52% 9.43% 7.91% 
Other 26.67% 12.50% 7.41% 15.00% 30.00% 16.07% 20.83% 25.71% 28.30% 22.60% 
 
Italy was an outlier due to the inability of its legal and political system to 
respond adequately to the requirements of Article 6, which generated a huge 
caseload.154 By the early 2000s, judgments against Italy—due in large part to the 
excessive length of Italian trials—accounted for an average of forty-five percent 
of the total number of judgments delivered by the Court.155 These cases against 
Italy are important as it is the first time the Court had to deal with structural 
human rights problems.156 Although the Italian government generally paid the 
damages awarded by the ECtHR, the root of the problem—the archaic legal 
proceedings—was not sufficiently reformed.157 
 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  This was mainly due to the lack of reforms of the judicial system and a reserved attitude 
towards the ECtHR by the highest courts. Mercedes Candela Soriano, The Reception Process in Spain 
and Italy, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 393, 
405 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). 
 155. It subsequently dropped to below ten percent in 2014. For details, see infra app. 1.  
 156. The question of structural human rights problems arises again below when analyzing the 
integration of the new Eastern European member states. 
 157.  See generally Candela Soriano, supra note 154.  
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The situation of Italy presented a new challenge for the Court, one the 
Court would face continuously during the following decade: that compliance 
was increasingly partial and judgments on particular issues seemed to lead to 
more, rather than fewer, cases challenging the same structural problems. 
Thereby the ECtHR judgments arguably generated more cases than it resolved, 
as the underlying structural problems were not fixed. In terms of the Court’s 
authority, this created a paradoxical situation of increased mobilization by 
litigants paired with relevant state agencies’ insufficient efforts to give effect to 
the ECtHR’s rulings. As a result, the Court’s intermediate and extensive 
authority increased while its narrow authority decreased. 
The plight of democratizing countries presented another new challenge to 
the Court as it had to not only monitor but also promote human rights. Turkey 
provides an apt illustration of the ECtHR’s authority in this complex context, a 
situation that also would become well known to the Court throughout the 
2000s. Turkey had accepted individual petition and the Court only in 1987 and 
1990 respectively, and cases from Turkey did not appear before the Court until 
the mid-1990s.158 The pattern of cases generally reflects Turkey’s distinctive 
social, political, and legal problems at that time. These problems included the 
contested status of the Kurds, which caused recurrent cases in Strasbourg, and a 
set of issues related to the modern Turkish state’s guarantee of basic civil 
liberties and political freedoms.159 
In terms of the authority of the ECtHR, the cases from Southeast Turkey 
stood out. For the first time, in Aksoy v Turkey, the Court found a respondent 
state in violation of the prohibition on torture.160 Violations of Article 3 were 
also found in a number of other cases involving the Turkish–Kurdish conflict.161 
Due to these and a steady stream of other human rights cases, the total number 
of judgments directly linked to southeast Turkey from 1996 to 2008 was 
approximately 175 cases, with another 1,500 pending in 2010.162 This was the 
first time the Court was faced with the challenge of gross and systemic human 
rights violations.163 
Turkey’s problematic assimilation into the ECHR system reveals two things 
 
158. In addition, there were interstate cases against Turkey in 1974, 1975 and 1977. See supra note 100. 
In 1983, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands v. Turkey, App. No. 9940–9944/82, 
35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 143 (1983). And again in 1997, Denmark v. Turkey, App. No. 
34382/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).  
 159.  See generally Aisling Reidy, Françoise Hampson & Kevin Boyle, Gross Violations of Human 
Rights: Invoking the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. HUM. 
RTS. 161 (1997). 
 160.  Case of Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996-VI 18 (1996). 
 161.  Rachel Chichowski, Civil Society and the European Court of Human Rights, in THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 77, 89–95 (Jonas 
Christoffersen & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2011). 
 162.  Başak Çalı, The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official Acknowledgment, 
and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court of Human Rights, 
1996–2006, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (2010). 
 163.  See generally Reidy, Hampson & Boyle, supra note 159.  
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about the changing authority of the ECtHR. First, most of the Kurdish cases 
would most likely never have been filed were it not for systematic lawyering 
facilitated in part by veteran British human rights lawyers.164 This suggests a 
linkage between the pioneering human rights constituents in Britain and the 
broadening of the ECtHR’s authority.165 Second, comparing the situations in 
Turkey and Italy foregrounds the sociopolitical reality that the Court serves 
very different functions in these two countries, ranging from the more technical 
modernization of the Italian judiciary to the democratization of Turkey. The 
ECtHR’s authority with respect to Turkey is also distinctive because the 
relevant government agencies have shown little recognition of the Court’s 
rulings in terms of implementing them. Of the approximately 2,400 cases 
decided against Turkey between 1987 and 2001, of which eighty-seven percent 
found at least one violation, around 1,700 judgments were not fully 
implemented as of 2012.166 This strongly indicates the Court’s limited narrow 
and intermediate authority in Turkey. Yet the fact that so many cases are 
directed to Strasbourg suggests conversely the emergence of a legal field in 
which the European Convention and the ECtHR are increasingly accepted 
among many audiences as a tool for legal and social change even though some 
government agents continue to resist it. 
In the bigger picture of the evolution of the ECtHR, however, Turkey and 
Italy are both outliers; France is a far more representative case of how the 
ECtHR generally developed extensive authority in many European countries 
throughout the 1990s. France fully entered the ECHR only in 1981, and the first 
judgments against France were not delivered until the mid-1980s.167 One of the 
key agents, la Cour de Cassation, the highest French court on civil and criminal 
matters, originally sought to integrate the ECtHR into its practices.168 An 
estimated 700 French decisions explicitly referring to the ECHR were issued 
between 1987 and 1997, and la Cour de Cassation was initially quick to 
incorporate the outcomes of cases against France before the ECtHR into its 
practices.169 In light of this collaborative mood, the French highest courts were 
surprised—if not offended—when the ECtHR began to criticize not only 
certain police and administrative practices in France but also the functioning of 
 
 164.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 165.  See Chichowski, supra note 161, at 89–94 (providing descriptive statistics on this linkage). See 
generally LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2011).  
 166.  Başak Çalı, Turkey’s Relationship with the European Court of Human Rights Shows that 
Human Rights Courts Play a Vital Role, but One that Can Often Be Vastly Improved, THE LONDON 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (Mar. 14, 2012), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ 
europpblog/2012/03/14/turkey-echr/.  
 167.  Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad  & Anne Weber, The Reception Process in France and 
Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 107, 
109 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).  
 168.  See generally Leslie Goldstein & Cornel Ban, The Rule of Law and the European Human 
Rights Regime, Center for the Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program 
(Working Paper No. 13, 2003). 
 169.  Id. at 23. 
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French courts.170 Counterattacking, the Cour de Cassation launched a rebellion 
against the Court in response to the rulings of the ECtHR on the impartiality of 
the general advocates of the Cour de Cassation—a similar situation would occur 
with regard to the Commissaires du gouvernement of the Conseil d’État—and a 
number of cases on more technical issues related to, for example, standards of 
interrogation.171 It was a real rebellion in the sense that the French court 
deliberately ignored the relevant ECtHR case law and, in some instances, 
ignored the ECtHR cases that had found France to be in violation of the 
ECHR.172 
Yet the use of the ECtHR to attack high courts in France simultaneously 
spurred an interest among lawyers in challenging the particularities of the 
French justice system as incompatible with the Convention.173 The ECtHR 
virtually became an appeals court to the supreme French courts; the number of 
cases grew steadily and France eventually became one of the three most 
frequent litigators in Strasbourg.174 The response from French judges was that 
the ECtHR simply failed to grasp the complexity of French justice in the 
Court’s pursuit of a superficial and formalist attempt to set uniform European 
standards.175 Regardless of rhetoric, there was little doubt that the ECtHR was 
becoming both a part of domestic legal reality and a force to be reckoned with 
in the French legal field at large. 
The French court system was not alone in coming under fire. The politico–
administrative elites also needed to respond to the criticism from Strasbourg, 
particularly after the 1999 case Selmouni v France,176  in which France was found 
guilty of torture. France was only the second member state that had been found 
guilty of violating this nonderogable right.177 This judgment cast a shadow 
beyond the legal field and its technical concerns. Selmouni became front-page 
news and confirmed that being the cradle of human rights did not automatically 
also mean being in the avant-garde of human rights.178 For French 
administrative and political elites, this controversial judgment, combined with 
the persistent need for technical reform due to other ECtHR judgments, was a 
serious challenge.179 In fact, it required rethinking the French raison d’état 
 
 170.  Madsen, supra note 12, at 78.  
 171.  J. P. Marguenaud, l’Effectivité des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme en 
France, 24 J. DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 1, 1–12 (2001).  
 172.  Lambert Abdelgawad & Weber, supra note 167, at 129.  
 173.  Id.  
 174.  See supra fig. 3.  
 175.  Madsen, supra note 12, at 78. 
 176.  See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, 32 (1999). For the first time, 
the Court found a respondent state to be guilty of torture. See Case of Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 
21987/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996-VI 18 (1996). 
 177.  Based on search in HUDOC Database of the European Court of Human Rights 
(http://hudoc.echr .coe.int/). 
 178.  Madsen, supra note 12, at 78. 
 179.  Id.  
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through the prism of the ECtHR.180 The bottom line was that the ECtHR could 
not be regarded simply as an external phenomenon when it was invoked 
continuously and successfully against French law and legal practice. 
Ultimately at stake in France, as well as in many other European countries 
during the 1990s, was whether to accept a new, much deeper national 
implementation of the Convention. The impact of the ECtHR was no longer 
limited to singular cases in Strasbourg; the Court began to transform more 
broadly the interface of law and politics through an ever-close transnational 
normative web.181 Due to the principle of monism of French constitutional law, 
which automatically incorporates the country’s international obligations into 
domestic legal law, the Convention had in principle been applicable 
domestically from the state’s ratification of the Convention in 1974—although 
this had little practical importance as individual petition was only accepted in 
1981.182 In most other member states, this domestication of the Convention 
required a specific legislative act.183 Throughout the 1990s, a growing number of 
countries incorporated the Convention by legislative acts.184 The main reason 
for this remarkable shift was arguably the general geopolitical zeitgeist, which 
favored human rights and neoconstitutionalism both nationally and regionally. 
With the incorporation of the ECHR into national law, the Convention 
became embedded185 in a substantially different way, which implied that 
national courts could apply the Convention. That domestic courts could apply 
the Convention almost immediately produced a significant growth in domestic 
suits that invoked Convention rights and freedoms, which in turn prompted 
more petitions to be filed with the Court.186 The package implemented by 
national institutions was not only the Convention and national cases that were 
lost in Strasbourg but also the developing acquis Strasbourgeois, that is, the 
entire case law of the ECtHR to date. Countries with few or hardly any cases 
through the late 1980s started having a more steady flow of cases to the Court.187 
But above all, there was massive growth in references to the Convention by 
national lawyers and, to a lesser extent, judges.188 Institutionally, the ECtHR 
became a de facto constitutional court for most member states because the 
Convention—although in most dualist countries only having the status of 
 
 180.  See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, RAISONNER LA RAISON D'ÉTAT : VERS UNE EUROPE DES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME 18 (1989) (arguing that there is a fundamental clash between the objectives of the 
ECHR and the craving of national sovereignty and difference in the member states). 
 181.  See supra fig. 3. 
 182.  See, e.g., Lambert Abdelgawad & Weber, supra note 167, at 115–16 (explaining the limited 
effect of the Convention because of French courts’ refusal to review the compatability of French 
domstic law with regard to the ECHR). 
 183.  For an overview, see HELEN KELLER & ALEC STONE SWEET, A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE 
IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (1998). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See Helfer, supra note 147. 
 186.  Id.  
 187.  See infra apps. 1 & 2. 
 188.  See generally Madsen, supra note 125.  
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statutory law—effectively governed human rights at a transnational 
constitutional level.189 
Viewed cumulatively, these trends transformed the undertaking of 
European human rights, making the Strasbourg system more akin to EU law: 
directly applicable and with supreme status.190 This striking development also 
changed how different constituencies engaged with the Court. The combined 
effects of the institutionalization of European human rights law in state 
bureaucracies, academic programs, and the portfolio of lawyers made European 
human rights an integral part of public and constitutional law across Europe.191 
Consequently, the ECtHR gained extensive authority in the vast majority of 
European countries and became part of the deep constitutional structure of 
national legal orders. The only real exceptions to this trend were Turkey and 
perhaps Italy, which were harbingers of the trouble the ECtHR would face in 
the following decade. 
B. From Protocol No. 11 to Backlash (2000–2014): New Directions for 
European Human Rights? 
As the new democracies of Eastern Europe were gradually accepted into 
the Council of Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s, the ECtHR was on a 
course of increased activity and potential case overload in its role as a de facto 
constitutional court of European human rights. The effect of new member 
states on the Court’s output in terms of the number of judgments was not 
registered until approximately 2005.192 However, the rapidly growing number of 
applications from new member states, which put the system under stress, was 
detectable before that.193 In light of the original Cold War objectives of the 
Convention, the accession of Russia to the Convention in 1998 was highly 
symbolic and was seen by many as a strong indication of the system’s success 
despite skepticism among some founding members.194 
Initially, Russia’s entrance had no significant impact. Most of the first 
applications—approximately 2,000 applications until 2001—were rejected as 
inadmissible, often on technical grounds.195 Only after 2004 did the Court 
deliver a number of high-profile judgments against Russia.196 Almost 
immediately thereafter, problems with Russian compliance and political 
 
 189.  Compare this to the Huneeus argument that neoconstitutionalism was central to human rights 
in Latin America. See generally Alexandra Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American 
Court’s Varied Authority, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 179. 
 190.  See Helfer, supra note 147. 
 191.  See, e.g., STEPHANIE HENNETTE-VAUCHEC & JEAN-MARC SOREL, LES DROITS DE L’HOMME 
ONT-ILS CONSTITUTIONNALISE LE MONDE? (2011); NEIL WALKER, JO SHAW & STEPHEN TIERNEY, 
EUROPE’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOSAIC (2011).  
 192.  See supra fig. 3. 
 193.  See infra app. 2.  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Pamela A Jordan, Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe 
and Compliance with Human Rights Norms, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 660, 681 (2003). 
 196.  Id.   
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discontent arose.197 Figure 5 indicates in each column the percentage of overall 
judgments with Russia as respondent and other respondent states that 
frequently appeared before the Court. It only includes the most regular 
litigators from Eastern and Western Europe. The percentage of Russian 
judgments grew steadily over the period, ending at about fifteen percent of the 
total amount of judgments.198 Several other new member states, for example 
Ukraine, also count for a significant percentage of total number of judgments.199 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
Figure 5 further reveals that the vast growth in decided cases cannot be 
explained simply by the entrance to the ECtHR of new member states with 
structural human rights problems. In other words, it is wrong to allocate the 
transformation in the level of output to only the geopolitical transformation and 
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 197.  Id. at 682. 
 198.  For details, see infra app. 2, where the precise calculations are found. 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  See fig. 5.  
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product of the growth model implicit in the expansive interpretive approach of 
the ECtHR developed in the context of a limited caseload discussed above, but 
now applied in a context of a rapidly expanding caseload in Strasbourg. 
Protocol No. 11 was an attempt at rationalizing the operation of the Court in 
light of a growing backlog of cases. The reform fit well with the pattern of 
previous overhauls of the system: in every reform of the ECHR system since 
1950—including all the additional Protocols No. 1 through 14bis from 1952 
through 2009202—the member states have chosen either to expand the Court’s 
jurisdiction or to introduce various technical changes to enhance its capability 
and capacity to carry out its function.203 There were, however, signs that 
technical rationalization was inadequate to resolve the new problems faced by 
the Court. For example, Russia had broken rank in initially refusing to join 
Protocol No. 14 in 2004, which was drafted to reduce the backlog by giving 
single judges and three-member panels the power to quickly dispose of 
meritless complaints.204 Russia’s relations with the Court steadily deteriorated 
from 2004 on; the Duma continuously refused ratification of Protocol No. 14 
until 2010.205 
Though the functioning of the Court had long been considered a matter of 
technical rationalization, the British offensive with the leaked Draft Declaration 
before the 2012 Brighton Summit further underscored that the power of the 
ECtHR was no longer beyond political debate.206 The subsequent Brighton 
Declaration stands out in comparison with earlier reforms for two reasons: It 
identified measures for further rationalization of the ECtHR, and it openly 
raised the political question of the future role of the Court with a series of 
negative comments on the quality of the judges and their judgments.207 
Subsequent Protocols Numbers 15 and 16 were explicitly designed to rebalance 
the system in favor of national levels of law and politics,208 although the actual 
contents of these Protocols also indicate the Court’s empowerment.209 
Although these reforms emphasized reducing the backlog of cases, the 
reforms also marked the beginning of what could appear as an odd, informal 
 
 202.  See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21, at 239; see also Harmsen, supra note 151, at 
120.  
 203.  See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21, at 237.   
 204.  Harmsen, supra note 151, at 126–32. 
 205.  With regard to the Court, it was notably the victories of Chechen applicants in, for example, 
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, App. No. 36378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) and then Ilaşcu 
and Others v. Moldova and Russia App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), about Russia’s role in the 
breakaway region of Transdniestria, that caused frictions with Moscow. The war between Russia and 
Georgia, the first ever between two CoE member states, only added to the deteriorating of relations. 
See LAURI MÄLKSOO, RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN HUMAN-RIGHTS LAW: THE RISE OF THE 
CIVILIZATIONAL ARGUMENT (2014). 
 206.  See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 22.  
 207.  BRIGHTON DECLARATION, supra note 22, ¶¶ 23, 25c.  
 208.  See CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21, at 241.   
 209.  See id.; Helfer, supra note 22 (arguing that the Brighton Declaration points toward more 
possible futures of the Court). 
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alliance between the United Kingdom and Russia. These two countries had in 
common that they were the most outspoken critics of the Court. This “alliance” 
was illustrative of growing discontent with the ECtHR that united critiques 
from governments and civil society facing Eastern and Western Europe’s 
starkly different human rights situations. 
The United Kingdom’s volte face with regard to the Court is striking. 
Throughout the 1990s, human rights were embedded into the fabric of British 
society through New Labour’s attempt at making human rights culture the 
ethos of multicultural Britain.210 The Human Rights Act of 1998 was thus a 
crowning moment that transformed the domestic legal status of human rights 
and started constitutionalizing British human rights law.211 The British 
turnaround to become critical of the ECtHR occurred in the aftermath on the 
War on Terror, when the Court—to Britain’s outrage—stopped deportation of 
some radical Islamists and terrorists.212 Other more technical cases caused 
additional political uproar, including Vinters and Others v. United Kingdom,213 
on the possibility of appeals of life sentences, and Hirst (No. II) v. United 
Kingdom,214 finding that a blanket ban on voting by British prisoners violated 
the Convention. 
Although Britain had been found to have violated the Convention in 
numerous comparably technical cases in years past, the political outrage in 
Vinters and Hirst stemmed from the ECtHR’s foray into a deeply polarized 
political arena. The ECtHR’s involvement in the cases was under intense media 
coverage that portrayed the Court as effectively overruling legitimate 
democratic British political decisions and the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Supremacy.215 
The Hirst case has generated an ongoing tug-of-war between judges in 
Strasbourg and British officials and politicians. Currently, there is open 
noncompliance with the Hirst decision and Britain has another twenty-six cases 
pending before the Committee of Ministers, the CoE body monitoring 
compliance with judgments.216 And although Margaret Thatcher previously told 
the Court to pull back, Prime Minister David Cameron is now threatening more 
dramatic action: to pull Britain from the Convention altogether. 
 
 210.  See Madsen, supra note 12, at 82–84 (demonstrating how human rights became part of 
mainstream politics and culture). 
 211.  Christopher McCrudden, Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. L. STUD. 499, 503–05 (2000).  
 212.  See, e.g., Conor Gearty, 11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act, 32 J. 
L. & SOC. 18, 29 (2005). 
 213.  See generally Case of Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 66069/09; 130/10; 
3896/10 (2013).  
 214.  Hirst v. The United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). 
 215.  See, e.g., David Davis, Britain Must Defy the European Court of Human Rights on Prisoner 
Voting as Strasbourg is Exceeding Its Authority, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH 65 (Spyridon Flogaitis et al. eds., 2013). 
 216.  See COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, Supervision of the Execution of 
Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,7 ANN. REP.1, 100 (2013). 
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The ECtHR has responded to Britain’s pushback with some hesitation in its 
subsequent jurisprudence. For example, in Scoppola v. Italy,217 the Court 
allowed for depriving prisoners of voting rights if there is a legitimate aim and 
deprivation is not automatic. But this hesitation is not driving all of the Court’s 
decisions. In McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom,218 the Court reasserted 
that a blanket ban on prisoners’ voting rights constituted a violation. The 
Court’s vacillation regarding Hirst is readily apparent: while the ECtHR is 
seemingly seeking to retreat in Scoppola from an overreach in Hirst, Britain has 
not budged on Hirst, and it intervened very strongly in Scoppola against Hirst. 
This British pushback in the courtroom, the media, and at the political level 
may be paying off as the ECtHR is now, seemingly, granting the United 
Kingdom a wider margin of appreciation—that is, it gives more deference to 
national decisions.219 As suggested by one ECtHR judge, the new conciliatory 
approach moves emphasis from substantial individual justice to more abstract 
procedural justice.220 If the member state can document that it has conducted a 
transparent review of the problem and the relevant ECtHR case law, and has 
involved the relevant actors, the ECtHR will be less likely to overrule the 
state’s decision.221 Although the Court’s retreat has been described as 
“qualitative, democracy-enhancing” in the member states,222 in light of the 
present analysis it would seem more appropriate to assert that the retreat’s 
main purpose is most likely to find a means that is authority-enhancing for the 
Court in the context of its tense interface with the United Kingdom. 
Consequently, the rights-oriented jurisprudence that became the Court’s 
trademark in the late 1970s is being supplemented, or replaced, by new forms of 
strategic judging reminiscent of the legal diplomacy of the early ECtHR. 
Compared to the United Kingdom, the situation in Russia is completely 
different. On one hand, Russia exemplifies the problem of structural human 
rights violations that are also visible in a number of other new member states. 
There are endemic and unsolved problems with due process, police brutality, 
prison conditions, and freedom of the press, as well as other rights.223 As of 2014, 
Russia has been the subject of 1,604 cases, and the Court found a violation in all 
 
 217.  See generally Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).  
 218.  See generally McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 51987/08 and 1,014 
others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015).  
 219.  See, e.g., MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App No. 39401/04, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 66 (2011); see 
also ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÓTTIR, RETHINKING THE TWO MARGINS OF APPRECIATION (2014) 
(demonstrating how such a change in appraoch is arguably taking place). 
 220.  See Robert Spano, Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?: Strasbourg in the Age of 
Subsidiarity, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 499 (2014). 
 221.  See, e.g., RMT v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31045/10, 366 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), Animal 
Defenders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48876/08, 57 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (2013), and A, B and C v. 
Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 222.  Spano, supra note 220.  
 223.  See Violations by Article and by State 1959-2014, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS. (2015), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2014_ENG.pdf.  
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but seventy-four.224 Comparatively, in the same period, Ukraine appeared in 
1,002 cases and only in ten were violations not found. Poland appeared in 1,070 
cases and nonviolation was found in 107 of them.225 Resembling the situation of 
Italy and Turkey, the rulings of the ECtHR with regard to a number of new 
member states seem not to solve the human rights problems at hand but instead 
highlight them and spur mobilization toward the Court, which engenders 
further backlog and political tensions. 
Yet Russia is an exceptional case. The fact that the country has been 
involved in numerous violent military disputes over territory has raised 
unprecedented issues relating to interstate conflict—earlier interstate 
complaints in the Cyprus, Greece, Northern Ireland, and Turkey cases never 
involved interstate war among member states.226 The Russo–Georgian War in 
2008 prompted not only an interstate complaint but also many individual 
applications.227 Likewise, the Chechen–Russian conflict produced numerous 
individual applications.228 Most recently, the Russo–Ukrainian warfare has 
trigged an interstate complaint.229 The Strasbourg system was never set up with 
such situations in mind.230 Though the Court overcame significant challenges as 
an instrument of democratization—witnessed in numerous cases from Eastern 
Europe and earlier, in Spain, Portugal, and Greece,231 it has been an ineffective 
tool for promoting democracy in warlike conditions.232 As a result of Russia’s 
contentious relationship with the Court, it is the odd man out. For example, 
although Russia has an accredited delegation in Strasbourg, its right to vote and 
to be represented in the Parliamentary Assembly’s main bodies has been 
suspended.233 Further, Russia has both been threatened with expulsion and has 
threatened to leave the CoE multiple times since 2000.234 
These examples of pushback from the United Kingdom and Russia are not 
the only signs of increasing challenges to the ECtHR’s authority. As recent 
reports from the Committee of Ministers have shown, compliance rates are 
declining, and most countries are now subject to compliance monitoring.235 The 
authority of the ECtHR, as argued by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen, is in part a 
 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id.  
 226.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
 227.  See, e.g., Georgia v. Russia (No. 1), App. No. 13255/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Georgia v. Russia 
(No. 2), Appl. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); and Georgia v. Russia (No. 3) Appl. No. 61186/09, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 228.  DOTHAN, supra note 17, at 255.  
 229.  Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/1, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).  
 230.  The original idea was precisely to intervene before such situations occurred. See generally 
Bates, supra note 1.  
 231.  SWEENEY, supra note 145.  
 232.  See generally Réne Provost, Teetering on the Edge of Legal Nihilism: Russia and the Evolving 
European Human Rights Regime, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 289 (2015). 
 233.  Id.  
 234.  Id.  
 235.  For details, see infra fig. 6. 
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kind of compliance. Where the state response is typically limited to paying 
damages without further implementation of judgments—in Russia, for 
instance—this challenges narrow authority.241 Where the states are seeking a 
dialogue and have demonstrated willingness to reform—Poland, for example—
this is not necessarily detrimental to narrow authority.242 It is clear that the 
Court’s narrow authority varies even among member states with structural 
problems. Although the Court has little narrow authority in Russia, the reverse 
situation exists for the Court in Poland and many other new member states 
engaging with the Court and Committee of Ministers to find solutions to 
structural problems. 
In addition to member states’ consequential steps toward giving full effect to 
the Court’s rulings, the other closely related criteria for assessing the ECtHR’s 
authority suggested by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen is recognition by 
constituencies.243 Member states’ rhetoric, increasingly critical of the Court, is 
salient in this regard. Although this discourse of discontent is rooted in very 
different legal and political circumstances from one country to another, these 
differences seem lost on many commentators. In fact, one can observe a 
diffusion of critical discourse: critics from countries with comparatively few 
cases in Strasbourg—such as Denmark and Finland—adopt the very same 
discursive means as states facing more serious challenges from Strasbourg.244 In 
the legal field, highly critical voices speak out in every single European state. 
Even presidents of national supreme courts are openly voicing their opposition 
to the ECtHR—most recently, the Supreme Court Presidents from the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, and Finland.245 Although bashing the ECtHR is not new, 
the generalization of the discourse across Europe and its application to very 
different human rights situations is quite novel. The United Kingdom’s current 
government does stand out, however, even from previous U.K. governments 
with its threat of leaving the ECHR; Russia is in part already ousted from the 
CoE. Most other member states, however, are not seeking such radical breaks 
with Strasbourg. 
Compared to the discourse of discontent, the Brighton Declaration, adopted 
by consensus, provides a different but more robust empirical indicator of the 
 
 241.  See DOTHAN, supra note 17, at 255.   
 242.  Id. at 237–38.  
 243.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 5. 
 244.  These statements are typically made at unrecorded seminars and less so in written material. 
See however, the statements by English Law Lords in Owen Bowcott, European Court is not Superior 
to UK Supreme Court, says Lord Judge, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com 
/law/2013/dec/04/european-court-uk-supreme-lord-judge, and Owen Bowcott, Senior Judge: European 
Court of Human Rights Undermining Democratic Process, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 28, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/nov/28/european-court-of-human-rights. 
 245.  See Bowcott, supra note 244 for English judges; for Belgium see MARC J. BOSSUYT, 
STRASBOURG ET LEASE DEMANDEUS D’ASILE: DES JUGES SUR UN TERRAIN GLISSANT (2010); for 
Finland see Pauline Koskelo, Domare, lagstiftare och professorer, SVJT 619, 620–41 (2014). See 
generally SPYRIDON FLOGAITIS, TOM ZWART & JULIE FRASER, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH (2013). 
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general recognition of the ECtHR by key constituencies—the member states’ 
governments.246 Importantly, at no point does the Declaration suggest reducing 
Convention rights or the acquis of Strasbourg.247 Although the Brighton 
Declaration is not limiting the Court’s subject-matter authority, it is 
nevertheless seeking to limit its future role in defining that authority by giving 
more power to national institutions.248 Nothing is fixed at the moment, and 
much probably depends on the Court’s ability to reduce the backlog of cases 
and implement reforms.249 The Declaration mainly seeks a different balance 
between the Court and the member states. But this unsolved balance between 
national and European human rights law creates a new uncertainty in the 
system where the Court seems to be seeking the approval of the constituencies. 
This rebalancing of the system—between law and politics and between the 
international and the national—might best be understood as an indicator of new 
fragility in the system.250 This fragility is apparent in the described efforts by the 
United Kingdom and Russia to reduce the ECtHR’s power over domestic 
matters. The very recent case law giving more leeway to member states is 
probably the first empirical indication of this decline of power of the ECtHR. 
But as suggested by Alter, Helfer and Madsen, power and authority are to be 
treated as two distinct phenomena. Following Alter, Helfer and Madsen’s 
framework, the Court’s power is currently challenged, but its overall authority 
is generally sustained, at least for the time being. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Not long ago, the ECtHR was heralded as “one of the most remarkable 
phenomena in the history of international law, perhaps in the history of all 
law.”251 Since the Brighton Declaration, Europeans have become accustomed to 
a different kind of discourse where both the judgments and the judges are 
scolded by fuming heads of states, members of the press, and senior members of 
the legal profession. As suggested, however, this new critical discourse is not 
necessarily a sign of shrinking ECtHR authority. Underneath this discourse lies 
an uneven human rights landscape with some member states facing very 
different challenges—qualitatively and quantitatively—in giving effect to the 
European Convention.252 Although this article does not exhaustively analyze all 
 
 246.  See BRIGHTON DECLARATION, supra note 22.  
 247.  CHRISTOFFERSEN & MADSEN, supra note 21 (arguing that the Brighton Declaration only 
suggests rebalancing the relationship between nationa and European law and politics).  
 248.  Id.  
 249.  Id. at 248. 
 250.  But see Gregory C. Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) 
Authority of the WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 267. 
 251.  Michael O Boyle, On Reforming the Operation of the European Court of Human Rights, 1 
EUR. HUM. RTS L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 252.  But see FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE. CHALLENGES AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2014) (arguing that some member states are 
MADSEN_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2016  7:22 PM 
176 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 141 
forty-seven member states, it is clear from the case studies examined here that 
the most serious challenges to the Court’s authority are concentrated in some 
member states, notably the United Kingdom and Russia. 
The United Kingdom and Russia, although having fueled broader public 
discontent with the Court, might be outliers in the bigger picture, however. 
Despite these member states’ fundamentally different human rights situations, 
they both move away from European consensus on human rights and the 
European integration project more generally. The United Kingdom’s projects, 
on one hand, have recently included threats of leaving the Convention and even 
the EU. And Russia, on the other hand, is pursuing the rise of the BRICs as an 
alternative way of restoring its power and threatening its flight from the CoE. 
These broader changes in the behavior of two important member states 
cannot be explained simply as a response to the quality of the rulings or the 
judges of the ECtHR. Instead, the change in behavior is a reflection of the 
transformation in the broader geopolitical contexts in which both the member 
states and the Court operates. The post–Cold War period catalyzed the Court’s 
rapid growth and an ideological demand for its services to democratize Eastern 
Europe. The current geopolitical situation has different demands. Although the 
“post–post Cold War” era has competing origins—the rise of China, 9/11 and 
the fight against terrorism, the financial crisis and resulting crisis in the 
European project and economy, et cetera—the era has resulted in new 
cleavages in Europe, including in the area of human rights. Specifically, there 
are indications, notably regarding to the ongoing conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine, that the boundary of Europe is being redrawn both geographically and 
symbolically. At the same time the United Kingdom is championing a different 
balance between national and European law and politics of human rights. There 
is nothing new in the fact that geopolitics prompts change in the delineation of 
liberal Europe and its commitment to human rights. On the contrary, as 
suggested by this analysis of the long-term evolution of the ECtHR, geopolitical 
transformations have consistently impacted the operation of the Court: Cold 
War, decolonization, détente, and the post–Cold War. The current geopolitical 
transformation will also—if it has not already—impact the authority of the 
ECtHR. What is uncertain, however, is the precise direction of that change. 
What we can observe right now is form of boundary politics of the space 
regulated by the ECHR both with regard to its geographical reach and its 
impact on the national level of law and politics. The question remains what 
impact that will have on the authority of the Court in the long run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consistly under the  common threshold, while others face very few problems).  
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Appendix 1: Select Member States’ Percentage of Total Output of Judgments 
 
              Year  
Country  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Austria 1.69% 
3.02
% 
2.03
% 
2.37
% 
2.70
% 
2.37
% 
1.99
% 
1.35
% 
1.53
% 
0.91
% 
0.92
% 
1.27
% 
1.04
% 
2.10
% 
1.64
% 
0.79
% 
Belgium 1.13% 
0.29
% 
0.56
% 
1.66
% 
1.14
% 
2.09
% 
1.27
% 
0.45
% 
1.00
% 
0.91
% 
0.68
% 
0.27
% 
0.78
% 
0.55
% 
0.98
% 
2.13
% 
Bulgaria 0.56% 
0.43
% 
0.34
% 
0.36
% 
1.56
% 
3.76
% 
2.08
% 
2.88
% 
3.53
% 
3.82
% 
3.88
% 
5.40
% 
5.35
% 
5.86
% 
2.84
% 
2.02
% 
Croatia 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.56
% 
1.07
% 
0.85
% 
4.60
% 
2.35
% 
1.41
% 
2.06
% 
1.23
% 
1.17
% 
1.40
% 
2.16
% 
2.10
% 
2.62
% 
3.03
% 
Denmark 0.00% 
0.86
% 
0.23
% 
0.24
% 
0.28
% 
0.42
% 
0.27
% 
0.13
% 
0.13
% 
0.13
% 
0.18
% 
0.00
% 
0.52
% 
0.09
% 
0.00
% 
0.22
% 
France 12.99% 
10.50
% 
5.07
% 
8.89
% 
13.37
% 
10.45
% 
5.52
% 
6.15
% 
3.19
% 
2.20
% 
2.03
% 
2.80
% 
2.85
% 
2.65
% 
3.93
% 
2.47
% 
Germany 1.69% 
0.43
% 
2.03
% 
1.07
% 
1.71
% 
0.84
% 
1.45
% 
0.64
% 
0.80
% 
0.65
% 
1.29
% 
2.40
% 
3.54
% 
2.10
% 
0.66
% 
1.46
% 
Greece 3.39% 
3.02
% 
2.36
% 
2.96
% 
3.98
% 
5.85
% 
9.50
% 
3.53
% 
4.32
% 
4.80
% 
4.62
% 
3.74
% 
6.30
% 
5.12
% 
4.15
% 
6.06
% 
Hungary 0.56% 
0.14
% 
0.34
% 
0.36
% 
2.28
% 
2.79
% 
1.54
% 
2.05
% 
1.60
% 
2.85
% 
1.85
% 
1.40
% 
2.94
% 
2.38
% 
4.59
% 
5.61
% 
Italy 40.11% 
56.98
% 
46.85
% 
46.45
% 
21.05
% 
6.69
% 
7.15
% 
6.60
% 
4.46
% 
5.44
% 
4.25
% 
6.60
% 
3.89
% 
5.76
% 
4.26
% 
4.94
% 
Moldova 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.11
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
1.39
% 
1.27
% 
1.28
% 
3.99
% 
2.14
% 
1.85
% 
1.87
% 
2.68
% 
2.47
% 
2.07
% 
2.69
% 
Netherlands 1.13% 
0.86
% 
0.79
% 
1.30
% 
1.00
% 
1.39
% 
0.90
% 
0.45
% 
0.67
% 
0.06
% 
0.25
% 
0.27
% 
0.52
% 
0.64
% 
0.11
% 
0.34
% 
Poland 1.69% 
2.73
% 
2.25
% 
3.08
% 
9.53
% 
11.00
% 
4.43
% 
7.37
% 
7.39
% 
9.14
% 
8.19
% 
7.14
% 
6.13
% 
6.77
% 
2.51
% 
3.14
% 
Romania 1.13% 
0.43
% 
0.11
% 
3.20
% 
3.98
% 
2.65
% 
2.99
% 
4.68
% 
6.19
% 
12.90
% 
10.34
% 
9.54
% 
5.87
% 
7.23
% 
9.61
% 
9.76
% 
Russia 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.24
% 
0.71
% 
2.09
% 
7.51
% 
6.54
% 
12.77
% 
15.88
% 
13.49
% 
14.48
% 
11.49
% 
12.26
% 
14.08
% 
14.48
% 
Slovakia 1.13% 
0.86
% 
0.90
% 
0.83
% 
3.84
% 
1.95
% 
2.62
% 
2.24
% 
1.53
% 
0.97
% 
2.40
% 
2.67
% 
1.81
% 
2.10
% 
1.75
% 
1.57
% 
Slovenia 0.00% 
0.29
% 
0.11
% 
0.12
% 
0.00
% 
0.00
% 
0.09
% 
12.18
% 
1.00
% 
0.58
% 
0.49
% 
0.40
% 
1.04
% 
2.01
% 
2.73
% 
3.48
% 
Switzerland 0.00% 
1.01
% 
0.90
% 
0.59
% 
0.14
% 
0.00
% 
0.45
% 
0.58
% 
0.47
% 
0.26
% 
0.43
% 
0.73
% 
0.95
% 
0.73
% 
1.42
% 
2.02
% 
Turkey 10.73% 
5.76
% 
25.79
% 
12.44
% 
17.64
% 
23.96
% 
26.24
% 
21.41
% 
22.02
% 
17.11
% 
21.92
% 
18.55
% 
15.11
% 
11.25
% 
13.54
% 
11.34
% 
Ukraine 0.00% 
0.00
% 
0.11
% 
0.12
% 
1.00
% 
1.95
% 
10.86
% 
7.69
% 
7.25
% 
7.13
% 
7.76
% 
7.27
% 
9.07
% 
6.50
% 
7.53
% 
4.49
% 
United 
Kingdom 
7.91
% 
4.32
% 
3.83
% 
4.74
% 
3.56
% 
3.34
% 
1.63
% 
1.47
% 
3.33
% 
2.33
% 
1.11
% 
1.40
% 
1.64
% 
2.20
% 
1.42
% 
1.57
% 
Other 14.12% 
8.06
% 
4.73
% 
7.94
% 
9.67
% 
10.45
% 
7.87
% 
8.91
% 
10.78
% 
8.55
% 
10.90
% 
10.41
% 
14.34
% 
17.11
% 
17.58
% 
16.39
% 
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Appendix 2: Number of Applications Allocated to a Judicial Formation per 
Year 
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